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The thirty-two year old woman delivered her two pound, twenty-five
week' baby at'six a.m.2 The delivery room was quieter than usual. Only a
nurse, obstetrician and pediatrician attended. The woman lay on the de-
livery table holding her husband's hand. Her baby did not cry or move.
The baby had died during the twelve-hour labor.
During the progress of the pregnancy, both parents had wanted this
baby very much. They had visited the prenatal clinic regularly. At
twenty-two weeks, the doctors noted that the mother's uterus was grow-
ing at an abnormally slow rate. The mother underwent ultrasonography
which revealed an abnormally small fetus. Because stunted fetal growth is
often due to abnormal chromosomes,8 the doctors performed an amnio-
centesis. Two weeks later, this test disclosed that the fetus had a condi-
* Clinical Assistant Professor, Division of Neonat6logy, University of Florida Health Sci-
ence Center, College of Medicine, Jacksonville, Florida. The author wishes to acknowledge
the assistance of Tracy Rambo and Leslie Hogan in the preparation of this article.
1 1 A full term gestation is forty weeks. The survival of a normal twenty-five week infant
given aggressive support is greater than 30%.
' Although based on an actual case, these facts have been altered slightly out of respect for
the privacy of the persons involved.
8 The physiological development of an individual is determined by chromosomes. Chromo-
somal abnormalities are a common cause of early trimester miscarriage, fetal growth retar-
dation, and postnatal developmental delay.
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tion known as trisomy-18. After consultation with a genetic counselor,
the parents decided to undergo an elective termination of the pregnancy.2
The obstetrician induced labor with a prostaglandin suppository, in-
ducing extreme uterine contractions. He sedated the mother with narcot-
ics. The nurses notified the pediatrician of the impending delivery. They
wanted a pediatrician present in case the baby was born alive; however,
neither they nor the pediatrician knew what to do if this situation actu-
ally occurred.
These parents had chosen to abort their child, assuming that it
would be born dead. Once delivery took place, did the pediatrician have
either an obligation or a right to override the implicit wishes of the par-
ents and resuscitate the infant?
INTRODUCTION
A. The Delivery Room: An Inappropriate Forum for Decision-Making
(1) Birth as an Emergency
Decisions affecting an individual's life should be made only after
careful and considered deliberation.' In the delivery room, this type of
decision is often unanticipated. Most parents expect to deliver a healthy,
full-term baby. This expectation may exist even if the parents are told
that their child will be abnormal in some way. The fantasy of a normal
pregnancy may persist even beyond the infant's birth.
Resuscitation decisions arise most commonly after delivery of ex-
tremely premature infants or of asphyxiated infants. In the case of pre-
mature delivery, a mother is often at the hospital alone, having recog-
nized suddenly that there were complications with her pregnancy.
Sometimes a premature delivery can be delayed with drugs. In these
cases, some deliberation can occur. Often, however, delivery is imminent,
' Infants with trisomy-18 have a life expectancy measured in weeks or months. Occasionally
such an infant will live through early childhood. All infants with this condition are also
severely mentally retarded.
' Abortion, also defined as "[t]he knowing destruction of the life of an unborn child or the
intentional expulsion or removal of an unborn child from the womb other than for the prin-
ciple purpose of producing a live birth or removing a dead fetus." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
7 (5th ed. 1979).
' See, e.g., Smith, The Rights of Infants with Down's Syndrome, 251 J. A.M.A. 229, 229
(1984). Prerequisites to decision-making include a knowledgeable physician and an informed
parent. Id. The American Academy of Pediatrics recommends a discussion with "consul-
tants with medical, legal, ethical and social expertise" before withdrawing life support from
an infant. See Charney, Management of the Newborn with Myelomeningocele: Time for a
Decision-Making Process, 75 PEDIATRICS 58, 58-64 (1985) (citing Weil, American Academy
of Pediatrics Policy Statement: Treatment of Critically Ill Newborns, NEWS & COMMENT,
October 1983, at 5).
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allowing several hours at the most for obtaining information about pre-
mature infants, discussing the implications of such information, and de-
ciding how to handle the birth.
In the case of an asphyxiated infant, a fetus is determined to have a
low or absent heart rate during labor or during prenatal testing. Gener-
ally, no discussion is possible as the mother is rushed to the delivery room
for an emergency caesarean section to save the infant. Any attempt at
obtaining "consent" to refrain from resuscitating a potentially brain-dam-
aged infant would be futile: the consent would be both rushed and unin-
formed. In asphyxia at least, physicians assume that resuscitation will be
performed.'
In all delivery room determinations, the emotional overlay to deci-
sion-making is high. When a mother delivers prematurely, or when a
mother delivers an infant knowing the infant possesses a birth defect, the
decision whether or not to resuscitate is made in the midst of the grieving
process." In all abnormal pregnancies, parents mourn the loss of both a
normal pregnancy and their "fantasy" child.9 A mourning time is a par-
ticularly inappropriate period in which to make such major decisions.
For the physician as well, the delivery of a high-risk infant is an emo-
tional period. The obstetrician must contend with conflicting emotions
over whether delivery is necessary or not; whether the mode of delivery
chosen is the best for both mother and child; whether the physician
waited too long before allowing delivery; and whether the physician was
correct in assessing the gestational age of the fetus. All of these considera-
tions will affect the outcome of the delivery and possibly the ultimate
outcome of the infant's survival. The pediatrician must deal with conflict-
ing emotions over whether he or she agrees with the obstetrical manage-
ment decisions, whether resuscitation will be appropriate or even effec-
tive, and whether the pediatrician agrees morally with whatever decisions
are made.
Inadequate time exists to collect information for the parents or for
7 See Goldenberg, Survival of Infants with Low Birth Weight and Early Gestational Age,
1979 to 1981, 149 AM. J. OBsTET. & GYMCOL. 508, 508-11 (1984) (reviewing use of survival
statistics in management decisions).
" See Sheagren, Grief Reaction to Sudden Unexpected Cardiorespiratory Arrest in a Nor-
mal Newborn Nursery, 26 CLIN. PEDU CS 369, 369-71 (1987) (after death of baby during
perinatal period, parents may grieve anywhere from months to years); Watchko, Decision
Making on Critically Ill Infants by Parents, 137 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 795, 795-98 (1983) (re-
viewing forum-decision versus parent/physician-decision schools on decision-making relating
to critically ill newborns).
' See Fost, Counselling Families Who Have a Child with a Severe Congenital Anomaly, 67
PEDiATmCS 321, 321-24 (1981) (discussing parental reaction and decision-making in cases of
birth of defective child). This reaction may occur in normal pregnancies and deliveries as
well, partly explaining "post partum blues" syndrome.
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the physician." For parents, the time shortage means having only the in-
formation supplied by those people present. Parents have no time to so-
licit second opinions or to investigate adequately the opinion given. For
physicians the time deficit means having to operate only on information
immediately available. The physicians have no time to review the medical
literature for possible alternative plans of management or for statistics on
infant outcome. They have no time to obtain another opinion from some-
one who might have more experience in a particular area. Neither parents
nor physicians have time to weigh or to mull over possible alternative
solutions to the problem.
The decision must be made without the benefit of contribution from
the infant. Since resuscitation decisions must necessarily be made either
before birth or immediately thereafter, there has been no time for the
parents to "bond" with their infant. A parent might make a different de-
cision once the baby is seen or held, or if the baby is vigorous and active
and responds to therapy rather than being lethargic and unresponsive.
A physician as well may make a different decision once he sees the
baby and how it responds to treatment. Different babies may have dispa-
rate reactions to the same stress and may respond very differently to
treatment." Until resuscitation has been initiated, a child cannot demon-
strate the ability to survive.'" The decision not to resuscitate a newborn
must rest solely on statistical data of other infants' abilities to survive
o See Charney, supra note 6, at 64. Decisions that can be delayed with no adverse conse-
quences to the baby, should be. Id. Doctors have studied situations where an emergency
traditionally was felt to exist. See id. In some cases, notably those dealing with meningomy-
elocoeles, it may make no difference in outcome whether correction is initiated immediately,
or after several weeks. Id. at 63.
11 See Welch & Phillips, Management of the Depressed Newborn, 27 CLIN. OBSTrT. &
GYNcOL. 131, 131 (1984). Cf. Henry, Toronto Conference Raises Serious Questions About
the Severely Handicapped Newborn, 122 CAN. MED. Assoc. J. 942, 942-44 (1980) (reporting
Chance's position that an individual infant's future is uncertain since even an infant with
poor prognosis can recover completely).
12 It has been suggested that resuscitation should be discontinued in the delivery room only
if the infant is non-viable, based on weight and/or gestational age, and the infant fails to
respond to resuscitative efforts. Martin & Fanaroff, Delivery Room Management of the Low
Birth Weight Infant, 27 CLIN. OBSTrr. & GYNEcOL. 636, 636-46,(1984).
Similar considerations arise in drowning accidents. Recommendations for resuscitation,
even in the face of signs demonstrating a uniformly poor outcome, include attempts at full
and aggressive resuscitation to be terminated only after "careful consideration of the partic-
ular circumstances in each individual case." Brooks, The Child Who Nearly Drowns, 135
AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 998, 998-99 (1981). In the nursery, some physicians advocate the use of an
"individualized prognostic strategy" for decision-making which includes a consideration of
the infant's response to treatment, in addition to relevant statistical information. See
Fischer & Stevenson, The Consequences of Uncertainty: An Empirical Approach to Medi-
cal Decision Making in Neonatal Intensive Care, 258 J. A.MA 1929, 1930-31 (1987). See
also infra notes 138-141 and accompanying text.
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with similar abnormalities."3 Moreover, it must rest on current data based
on current technology. Decisions rarely contemplate possible future tech-
nological advances."' For example, a child born with no intestines will
probably not be resuscitated even though the possibility exists of future
intestinal transplants. 5
(2) Irrevocable Decisions
A decision not to resuscitate is irrevocable. However, the decision not
to resuscitate does not necessarily mean the baby will die. Delivery room
resuscitation is needed for stillborn infants, for depressed infants, or for
active and otherwise healthy babies who, because of prematurity, have
inadequate lung capacities. In all of these catagories, infants can improve
on their own. Even an occasional stillborn infant may start gasping and
have a heartbeat when dried off and wrapped in a warm towel. If the
infant lives in spite of initial non-resuscitation, his prognosis may be
much worse.16 If resuscitation was initially withheld, brain damage from
oxygen deprivation may be exacerbated. Lung collapse from prematurity
may be worse, requiring more ventilatory support later on, along with its
concomitant complications.17 Organ systems may be irreparably damaged
from shock.
If the infant dies after resuscitation is withheld, the decision may be
regretted later. Parents may later read of similar incidents where the in-
fant survived through a happy childhood. They may feel differently after
they have held their dead child. In the case presented above of the geneti-
cally defective infant aborted at twenty-five weeks, the parents had not
realized that the physical appearance of their child would not be affected.
Before the abortion, the genetic counselor and obstetrician had spoken to
's See Stevenson, Ariagno, Kutner, Raffin & Young, The "Baby Doe" Rule, 255 J. A.M.A.
1909, 1909-12 (1986) (no acceptable criteria exist to determine prognosis for every individual
infant). As part of a heated debate among health care professionals regarding treatment
decisions of handicapped newborns, one commentator condemna the use of "diagnostic pig-
eon hole[s]" to determine treatment. McLaughlin, Decisions on Death and Dying, 68 PEDI-
ATRIcS 907, 907-08 (1981). McLaughlin's concern with different outcome potentials for seem-
ingly similar infants combines with his concern for a possible legal abridgement of civil
rights by "denying an individual access to services on the basis of diagnostic class." Id. at
907.
14 McLaughlin, supra note 13, at 907.
' But see Rennie, Bubble Boy, 253 J. A.MA 78, 78-80 (1985) (infants born with no immune
system raised in sterile plastic "bubbles" dramatic example of resuscitation in hope of fu-
ture cure).
" See Dawodu & Effiong, Neonatal Mortality: Effects of Selective Pediatric Interventions,
75 PEDATRIcs 51, 51-57 (1985) (even simple delivery room resuscitative measures without
subsequent intensive care will result in decreased mortality).
17 See Martin & Fanaroff, supra note 12, at 637.
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them about genetic "defects" and "abnormalities." The parents had pic-
tured a tragically deformed child who they believed would have a misera-
ble life. They had not understood the reality that their child's appearance
would not be unusual. They regretted their decision once they saw their
youngster's lifeless body after the procedure had concluded. Thus, follow-
ing the tense environment of the delivery room and the hectic, emotion-
filled period of childbirth, calm deliberation may reveal a devastatingly
incorrect decision.
B. History of the Problem
The decision to resuscitate a newborn baby traditionally has rested
with the individual delivering the infant. Historically, a midwife made the
decision. A stillborn infant was a dead infant. Attempts at artificial respi-
ration or resuscitation by stimulation were more often futile than not.
Premature infants determined their own fate after delivery by surviving
or dying after being warmed and dried.
With developing technology came a trend towards more vigorous re-
suscitative efforts in the delivery room. Stillbirths can now be distin-
guished from deadbirths and can often be revived with assisted ventila-
tion, infusion of intravenous or intracardiac drugs, and maintenance of
warmth. Premature infants with underdeveloped lungs can be resusci-
tated and maintained for long periods with artificial ventilation, extra ox-
ygen, intravenous fluids and other techniques developed within the past
fifteen years. s Early resuscitation of premature infants decreases their
mortality rate.
Once deliveries shifted from the home to the hospital, physicians
made the decision whether a child should be resuscitated in the delivery
room. The decision was based on the individual physician's belief as to
the infant's potential for survival. An infant who was "too small" was not
resuscitated; the same was true for infants determined to be "too de-
formed" or "too sick."' 9 Infants with severe abnormalities were some-
times manipulated in the delivery room to ensure they would not survive.
With the advent of civil rights movements, increasing malpractice lit-
igation, and a trend toward "natural childbirth," as well as an increasing
social awareness, parents began to participate more actively in these de-
"s See Gilstrap, Survival and Short-Term Morbidity of the Premature Neonate, 65 OBsTr.
& GYNECOL. 37, 37-41 (1985); Hershel, Survival of Infants Born at 24 to 28 Weeks Gesta-
tion, 60 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 154, 154-58 (1982); Robson & Hay, Resuscitation of Preterm
Babies at Birth Reduces the Risk of Death From Hyaline Membrane Disease, 57 ARCH. Dis.
CHILD. 184, 184-86 (1982).
' See Gilstrap, supra note 18, at 37 (as recently as 1985 some doctors still questioned bene-
fit of aggressive therapy for infants born at twenty-three to twenty-nine weeks gestational
age where morbidity could be high).
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livery room decisions.20 A parent in premature labor or a parent who be-
cause of ultrasonography knew that the child was defective could opt not
to have her baby resuscitated. Physicians almost invariably followed the
parents' wishes.
Questions still remained. Infants delivered by caesarean section after
fetal distress, infants delivered with unanticipated life-threatening condi-
tions, and small prematures were still delivered without any discussions
with the parents as to whether or not to resuscitate. Even more dis-
turbing than the question of whether or not to resuscitate these unantici-
pated high-risk infants without parental consent is the issue of whether
parents even have the right to make such a decision.21 If they do not have
the right-who does?
C. A Conflict of Rights
Traditionally, parents "owned" their children.22 Children had no in-
dividual rights of their own. Parents had ultimate control over all aspects
of their children's lives. The paradigm2 3 of ultimate parental control is
slowly eroding 4 in favor of a new paradigm of individuality and a child's
individual rights.2 5 The new standard examines children's and parents'
rights in relation to one another and "balances" them to determine a
Is Weil, Issues Associated With Treatment and Nontreatment Decisions, 138 AM. J. Dis.
CHILD. 519, 519-22 (1984). Dr. Weil suggests that the shift from physician to patient deci-
sion-making is due to a recognition of "autonomy over one's own body." Id. at 519.
" See Veatch, Medical Ethics, 252 J. A.M.A. 2296, 2296-2297 (1984) (suggesting that it may
be that no individual has ultimate right to decide, and every decision may be subject to
judicial review).
Is See Klaus, Commentary: Ethical Decision Making in Neonatal Intensive Care, 13 BIRTH
175, 175 (1986) (statement that "[tihe infant belongs to the parents" demonstrating how
this traditional notion continues to pervade thinking among physicians). But see Leiken,
Children's Hospital Ethics Committees: A First Estimate, 141 Am. J. Dis. CHILD. 141, 954-
58 (1987) ("[c]hildren do not belong to their parents.").
Is Cf. KUHN, STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-17, passim (2d ed. 1970) (developing
concept of paradigms in evaluating scientific evolution).
" See Victoroff, Questions and Answers on the "Baby Doe" Rulings, 81 COLO. MED. 109,
109-110 (1984). Cf. Strain, The Decision to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment for Seriously
Ill Newborns, 72 PEDIATRICS 572, 572 (1983) ("[n]o longer is a child considered chattel
whose fate is determined solely by the parents.").
Is See Bartholome, Decisions on Death and Dying, 68 PEDIATCS 910, 910 (1981). Pediatri-
cians, in particular, dislike the concept of children as chattel. See id. Bartholome strongly
urges that children, "[i]f they 'belong' to anyone, they belong to themselves[.J" Id. A recent
study of Massachusetts physicians demonstrates that today pediatricians as a group seem to
support the interests of the infant more strongly that other specializations; previously, how-
ever, they were more willing to defer to parental decision-making. See Todres, Guillemin,
Grodin & Batten, Life-Saving Therapy for Newborns: A Questionnaire Survey in the State
of Massachusetts, 81 PEDIATRIcS 643, 643-46 (1988).
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course of conduct.26
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional right of parents
to oversee the rearing of their children. 27 However, this is not an uncondi-
tional right.28 Parents waive this right when they demonstrate their pa-
rental unfitness by participating, for example, in child abuse.2 9 The dis-
cretion to remove the right of parenting rests with the courts. The
parental right can be outweighed by the child's more pressing right to
health and well-being.
The Supreme Court has also recognized a mother's constitutional
right of privacy, 0 allowing her to abort her fetus before it becomes via-
ble. 1 The Court implies a correlative fetal right to life after viability
2
which outweighs the parental right to privacy.33 The mother's rights and
the rights of the fetus are therefore in conflict once the fetus is viable.
This Article will examine the conflicting rights of the newborn infant
and the infant's parents. In delineating the infant's rights, an attempt
will be made to explore the development of those rights from the fetal
stage," through the penumbral point of birth, to infancy. Does an infant
s See Comment, Criminal Liability of a Prospective Mother for Prenatal Neglect of a Via-
ble Fetus, 9 WHITTIER L. REV. 363, 381 (1987) (commenting on Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J.
353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960), and noting that "the courts view that a child had a right to begin
life with a sound mind and body, appears to give the child somewhat of a preferred position
over that of a parent's right to reproduce."). The balance of rights is applied not only to
infant rights but also fetal rights. See generally Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights:
Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty; Privacy and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L.J. 599, 599-611 (1986) (reviewing development of fetal rights in relation to estab-
lished maternal rights).
'7 See Stark, Constitutional Analysis of the Baby M Decision, 11 HARV. WOMsEN'S L.J. 19,
35-36 (1988) (exploring nature of parental interests in a child they have "conceived, carried
and [given birth to] . . . " in surrogacy context).
" See Vitiello, Baby Jane Doe: Stating a Cause of Action Against the Officious Intermed-
dler, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 863, 867 (1986).
" See id. Some commentators do not view child abuse laws as protecting a child's rights
over parental rights; rather, they see them as supporting a high state interest in protecting
children which overcomes a weaker parental "autonomy" interest. Id.
So See Johnsen, supra note 26, at 600.
a See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 161-63 (1973).
See Field, Gates, Creasy, Jonsen & Laros, Maternal Brain Death During Pregnancy:
Medical and Ethical Issues, 260 J. A.M.A. 816, 821 (1988) (hints of fetal rights after viability
seen as early as 7th century B.C., when Roman laws required abdominal delivery of fetuses
whose mothers had died). Current technology is being used to support mothers suffering
brain death to assure the continued viability of a fetus being carried. Id.
33 Cf. Smith, Disabled Newborns and the Federal Child Abuse Amendments: Tenuous Pro-
tection, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 765, 782 (1986).
" See Note, State Prohibition of Fetal Experimentation and the Fundamental Right of
Privacy, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1073, 1094 (1988) [hereinafter Fetal Experimentation] (noting
"[w]hile Roe found that the fetus was not a person ... it did not declare the fetus a 'legal
nonentity.' "). Thus, fetal rights may vary, depending on the context in which they are ex-
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have a right to "attempt life," even where the potential for long-term sur-
vival of the infant is slight?
This Article will also seek to reveal the delivery room as an inappro-
priate place in which to make decisions that may violate an infant's
rights, reviewing the dangers inherent in having parents, physicians or
committees substitute their judgment for the rights of the newborn. The
standards of decision-making currently used in the delivery room and the
hazards inherent in those standards will be reviewed. Finally, this Article
will suggest that the delivery room should rarely, if ever, be the site for
such decision-making: all babies should be resuscitated at birth, and de-
terminations regarding continuing treatment of the high-risk infant
should be deferred to a more appropriate time and place.
INCONSISTENT DECISIONS BASED ON UNDEFINED RIGHTS
A. A Parent's Right to Decide
Allowing parents ultimate control over decision-making in the deliv-
ery room assumes a parental right to make decisions determining an in-
fant's life or death." Do the parents actually have this right, and if so,
where does it come from? Many people immediately assert that parents
should decide for their child in all circumstances.3 6 On an emotional level,
and perhaps on an ethical one, this view is understandable. Who better
than a child's parents could make a decision for their child? However, on
another level, when the interests of parent and infant conflict, the parents
may be in the worst position to make such decisions because they may
consider their own interests as superior, to their child's detriment.
The law gives a mother rights over her pre-viable child's life. The
Supreme Court, in Roe v. Wade,3 7 recognized a maternal right of privacy
that outweighs any fetal right to "potential life." However, the Court
shifted the balance to favor fetal life at the "compelling" point in preg-
nancy where the fetus is able to sustain its own life outside the womb."s
After viability, state law can prevent a mother from choosing to terminate
her pregnancy. If the mother's life or health is endangered, however, the
amined. See id.; see also Note, The Pamela Rae Stewart Case and Fetal Harm: Prosecution
or Prevention?, 11 HAitv. WOMEN's L.J. 227, 231-32 (1988) [hereinafter Pamela Rae] (noting
tendency of some advocates to give fetuses rights that would completely abrogate maternal
rights).
" See Fetal Experimentation, supra note 34, at 1093.
"* See Smith, supra note 33, at 769 (commenting on assumption that parents have final
decision-making role for treatment of their children).
37 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
" Id. at 162-63. Once viability is reached, the mother "loses the liberty to act in ways that
would adversely affect the fetus." Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Con-
ception, Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 V& L. REv. 405, 437 (1983).
33 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
mother's right to life outweighs the fetus' right to potential life. Even if
abortion is allowed to save the mother's life, a state, in protecting the
fetus' interest, may still require that the fetus be resuscitated. 9
A child's right to life has been the focal point of many so-called
"wrongful life" cases, where courts have held that any life is better than
no life at all.' 0 Although recent decisions have allowed recovery for the
pecuniary costs of a handicap,' 1 they have specifically denied recovery for
diminished capacity to enjoy life.4'2 Not only are such damages specula-
tive, but as one New Jersey court noted, the infant's right to life itself is
intangible."
While the Constitution gives the mother a right of privacy which
overrides the rights of her non-viable fetus, it does not give the mother a
right of parenting before birth. The woman's right to privacy is in her
individual, not parental capacity. Since the abortion right is that of per-
sonal autonomy and not a right of parenting, a father has no constitu-
tional right over his unborn, non-viable child." A father has no constitu-
tional right of privacy in abortion since he cannot give birth. A woman
may terminate her pregnancy prior to viability without consent of the
father,'5 and even in spite of the father's wishes to the contrary.4' The
paternal role in pregnancy management after viability is unclear.
" See, e.g., Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 485-86
(1983) (upholding requirement of having a second physician present at an abortion per-
formed in the third trimester to assist "in preserving the life and health of the child.").
40 See Vitiello, supra note 28, at 884.
41 See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 413, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895,
901 (1978).
"' See Vitiello, supra note 28, at 882-84. Courts have refused to decide that no life is better
than life with handicaps, implying that any life is better than no life at all. See, e.g., Becker,
46 N.Y.2d at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900 ("whether it is better never to
have been born at all than to have been born with even gross deficiencies is a mystery...").
,' See Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). See generally Fain, Wrongful
Life: Legal and Medical Aspects, 75 Ky. L.J. 585, 591-613 (1986-87) (historical review and
philosophical background of so-called "wrongful life" litigation in U.S.).
" See Jonsen, Transition from Fetus to Infant: A Problem for Law and Ethics, 37 HAs-
TINGS L.J. 697, 700 (1986) (paternal right over fetus may be seen historically in early Roman
law).
4 See Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
• See Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 491 (1983); Ak-
ron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 492 (1983); Beilotti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 650-51 (1979); Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74. The contrast between the right of privacy
and the right of parenting is elucidated in this series of Supreme Court cases, which deal
primarily with the requirement of parental consent for their minor child's abortion. The
cases permit laws requiring parental consent for minors who are "immature" or not suffi-
ciently emancipated. However, minors who are considered ineligible to make such decisions
are permitted to prove to the court that their own decision is preferable to that of their
parents. Moreover, courts must provide an opportunity for a minor to prove that she is in
fact sufficiently mature and emancipated to make her own decision.
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The Supreme Court established a constitutional right of parenting in
Pierce v. Society of Sisters.4 7 The Pierce Court upheld the "liberty of
parent and guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children
under their control.' 8 The Court based the child-rearing right on paren-
tal autonomy. This parental autonomy, however, was held not to be abso-
lute. 49 In Prince v. Massachusetts,5" the Court refused to permit parents
"to make martyrs of their children."" Following this logic, other courts
have almost uniformly mandated medical treatment for children in life-
threatening situations whose parents objected to such treatment on reli-
gious grounds.2
Courts have refused to extend the liberty of parenting to include the
decision over life and death." Child-abuse statutes and common law au-
thority removing children from parental care when the child's life or
health is in danger"' demonstrate the vast distinction between right of
upbringing and right over another's life.5 As one commentator noted, the
right of parents in making a life-or-death decision for their child is
merely the right to decide not to rear that child; it is not the right to
allow the child to die.56
B. An Infant's Right to Life
Legislation generally has supported a child's right to life and health
when that right conflicts with the parental right of child-rearing.5 7 Par-
ents are subject to criminal sanctions when they negligently disregard
their child's medical needs. 8 Courts have required blood transfusions for
.7 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
' Id. at 534-35.
" See id.
50 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
s Id. at 170.
2 See Smith, supra note 33, at 780-81.
S See Vitiello, supra note 28, at 890.
See id.
See generally Smith, supra note 33, at 775-81 (summarizing limitations on parental
child-rearing rights).
See Robertson, supra note 38, at 462.
17 See Victoroff, supra note 24, at 109. A societal norm to prefer life over death is generally
recognized. See Smith, supra note 6, at 229. Even physicians tend to assume that infants
have a right to life and generally do prepare for resuscitation of ill infants in almost all
instances. See Jassani, A Perinatal Approach to the Diagnosis and Management of Gastro-
intestinal Malformations, 59 OBSTTr. & GYNECOL. 33, 33-39 (1982) (ability to diagnose mal-
formations prenatally beneficial in anticipating resuscitation; no mention made of possibility
of non-resuscitation).
" See State v. Williams, 4 Wash. App. 908, 918, 484 P.2d 1167, 1174 (1971). In Williams,
both parents were found guilty of manslaughter after failing to obtain medical care for their
fourteen-month-old son, who died from infection of a gum abscess. Id. at 909, 484 P.2d at
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minor children of Jehovah's Witnesses.5 9
Traditionally, disputes between a child's rights and parental rights
arise well after the child's birth. Such issues were rarely phrased in terms
of the minor's rights, but instead tended to focus on the state's interest in
protecting the minor. Recent court decisions concentrate more on the in-
dividual child's rights. Tribunals may compel a pregnant woman to un-
dergo a caesarean section to save the life of an unborn child. 0 The trend
is to deny mothers the right to make decisions that will result in their
child's or viable fetus' death."1 Courts imply that the viable fetus itself
has a right to life that outweighs all conflicting maternal rights save the
right to life and health. 2 Some courts have implicitly denied women the
maternal right to prevent resuscitation of an aborted fetus that is born
alive.63
As technology improves, rights of the fetus may be triggered earlier
and earlier in the pregnancy. As the Supreme Court noted in Roe, the
stage of viability is usually twenty-eight weeks, but may be as early as the
twenty-fifth. Current technology has saved even twenty-three week fe-
tuses that were born alive. Fetuses can now be kept alive with routine
techniques that only ten years ago were considered extraordinary. " Some
commentators attribute the decision-making dilemma to the advances in
technology. 5 Without these advances, small prematures could not be
saved and the question of their rights would not arise.
Some infants saved with modern technology are defective, however.
As one commentator stressed, "life-saving technology .. . is capable of
prolonging infants at a near-vegetative level of existence."66 Along with
1168. The court held the parents liable by applying a negligence standard, finding that the
parents breached their duty of care to their helpless child. Id. at 918, 484 P.2d at 1174.
"' See, e.g., Application of the President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d
1000 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964).
"0 See, e.g., Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding Co. Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 90, 274 S.E.2d 457,
460 (1981). See also Pamela Rae, supra note 34, at 231-41 (reviewing application of criminal
sanctions to pregnant women for mistreatment of fetuses); Robertson, supra note 38, at 458-
62 (reviewing fetal-maternal conflicts).
"1 See Johnsen, supra note 26, at 604-608.
" See id. at 613.
'4 See Massachusetts v. Edelin, 371 Mass. 497, 359 N.E.2d 4 (1976) (acquitting abortionist
of manslaughter only because there was no proof that fetus was alive at birth), overruled,
Massachusetts v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). See also Robertson, supra
note 38, at 462 (contrasting rights of newborn to be resuscitated with maternal child-rearing
rights).
" See Nuespiel & David, Pediatric Health Rationing: Recent Trends and Lessons from
History, 139 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 757, 757-58 (1985).
" See id. at 758.
" See Walters, Approaches to Ethical Decision Making in the Neonatal Intensive Care
Unit, 142 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 825, 825-30 (1988).
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advanced technology comes added considerations in delivery room deci-
sions. No longer is the conflict between the rights of two individuals in
the conventional sense, but may be between a "normal" individual and a
potentially severely handicapped one. Assessing the severity of possible
handicaps and mediating conflicting rights requires more deliberation
than can be done in the emotion-filled atmosphere of the delivery room.
In the hospital setting, an attempt should be made to resuscitate all in-
fants. If the infant's right to life is to be denied, it should be denied later,
when all aspects of a complex issue can be evaluated fully.
PROTECTING A NEWBORN'S RIGHT TO LIFE: WHO SHOULD DECIDE?
Even after a right to life has been recognized in a fetus and in an
infant, a mechanism must be established to protect that right."7 Of
course, as a legally incompetent individual, the infant cannot protect its
own rights. Some states permit individuals to record their medical man-
agement decisions in so-called "living wills," to be honored after the indi-
vidual has become incompetent. This statutory option, obviously, is not
available to an infant who never had the legal capacity to execute such a
document.
Jon Watchko identifies two schools of thought regarding decision-
makers. The first, propounded by Fost, would provide an ideal decision-
maker. This individual would possess ideal decision-making qualities, in-
cluding omniscience, omnipercipience, disinterest, dispassion and consis-
tency.68 According to Fost, since no human exists with all these qualities,
a committee or tribunal comes closest to fulfilling the ideal.69
The second school, advocated by Duff, includes parental input as an
integral part of decision-making.70 Families and patients should remain
the core of medical resolution. The tenets of this school, like those of
Fost, are unsuitable when applied to the delivery room.
A. Parents as Decision-Makers
Courts have permitted guardians to speak for incompetents in several
situations. In a landmark case dealing with withdrawal of life support,
Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz,71 the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts allowed guardians of an incompetent individual to make a
"substituted judgment" for him according to what he "probably" would
'7 See Weil, supra note 20, at 521.
See Watchko, supra note 8, at 795 (quoting Fost, Ethical Issues in the Treatment of
Critically Ill Newborns, 10 PEDIATRics ANN. 16, 16-22 (1981)).
" See id.
7' See id. at 796.
71 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
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have decided had he been competent at the time. Similarly, in In re
Quinlan,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the parents of an irre-
versibly comatose woman to decide to withdraw their daughter's life sup-
port system. Notable in these cases and in those similar was the age of
the incompetent patients. The patients had all been competent at one
time, and thus the decision-makers could surmise in one way or another
what the individual's decision probably would have been.
Following Quinlan, courts have allowed parents to decide the medical
management of irreversibly comatose children, including the removal of a
child from life support. In those cases, courts have reasoned that contin-
ued medical support merely prolonged the act of dying. For those coma-
tose children, the right of life became subordinate to the right to die.
Whatever decision was made, the ultimate outcome for comatose children
remained the same: they would die without ever regaining consciousness.
A similar rationale to that of withdrawal of life support in comatose
individuals has been proposed to allow parents to refuse treatment for
children with incurable diseases. For example, a child born with
anencephaly (a total lack of brain development) cannot live indefinitely,
even with maximal medical support. Whatever decision the parents make
will not change the outcome.
However, failure to initiate support for an infant who will soon die
with or without the support may not be the same as failure to initiate
temporary support for an infant who might live indefinitely. A severely
asphyxiated child, for example, may live indefinitely on assisted ventila-
tion. The child may eventually recover if treated aggressively so that the
medical support is not needed, eventually leaving the hospital and grow-
ing toward normal adulthood. If his parents decide against aggressive
therapy, the child would probably die. The ultimate outcome for the as-
phyxiated child, therefore, depends on the decision for aggressive ther-
apy. In the case of an anencephalic infant, physicians and parents know
with certainty what the result will be. In the case of an asphyxiated in-
fant, they can only guess at this, based on statistics of how other similarly
situated infants have fared. When the outcome will be the same whatever
decision is made, it does not really matter who makes the decision. Most
delivery room decisions, unfortunately, do determine what the infant's
fate is likely to be.
Parents may be in a uniquely unsuitable position to make decisions
for their infant in the delivery room, and perhaps even in the nursery.
The emergency conditions under which these decisions are made under
make them hasty ones, and, therefore, inherently unreliable.7 3 The ex-
"s 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1974), cert. denied sub. nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
73 See Smith, supra note 33, at 766 (during emotional crises, parentaldecision-making may
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treme emotional nature of these decisions add to their unreliability. The
conflict between the parent's rights and the infant's may cause the in-
fant's rights to be compromised."4 The overlay of preconceived notions
about a particular disease and the excessive influence that others may
have over the parents in a time of stress may combine to produce a par-
ticularly unsatisfactory result.
75
In the delivery room, parents often concentrate on their own inter-
ests, rather than those of their child.7 6 A hurried decision in the delivery
room or in the labor room may well determine the child's future. If a
parent decides to have a child resuscitated, will that decision mean that
the parent will have to raise a disabled infant? If the decision is to forego
resuscitation, does that necessarily mean the child will die? Perhaps the
child will be even more disabled than would otherwise have been if resus-
citation had been instituted.
The idea that abandoning resuscitation, or other aggressive measures,
will lead to exacerbation of a poor outcome is rarely discussed. For exam-
ple, one mother decided to decline a caesarean section for her tiny
twenty-five week premature who had evidence of oxygen deprivation dur-
ing labor. The obstetrician had told the mother that the caesarean proce-
dure would give the infant the best chance of survival. He had also told
her that babies born at that stage had only a small chance for normal
development, and had, based on this fact, actually recommended against
caesarean delivery. The mother took the recommendation, believing it
preferable that her baby die rather than face the obstacles of living with a
severe handicap. She did not realize that the choice included a third out-
come, that her infant might be born alive after a vaginal delivery with
handicaps far more severe than they might have been otherwise.
In this case, the mother decided the fate of her child within hours of
arriving at the hospital in premature labor. She did not fully understand
the nature of her decision. Because it was a rapid decision made during a
time of great emotional stress, it was a poor decision. The mother was in
labor and in pain. Although she had been told that she was about to de-
liver, she did not really believe it. She still harbored a fantasy that her
"rest on factors irrelevant to the best interests of the child.").
"' See id. at 775 (parent decision-makers exercise "substituted privacy" right for child).
76 See Fost, supra note 9, at 322. Some observers suggest that parents act as proxies for
their child. Id. However, a valid proxy assumes adequate parental information and that the
parent will be holding the child's interests as paramount in importance. Id.
" How parents should consider their children is the subject of increasing debate. One
method of consideration is the child's "best interests" as the basis of decisions about life
and death. The problem, however, is that a parent may not be able to put a child's best
interests before his or her own. Fost, supra note 9, at 323; Weil, supra note 20, at 520-21
("some mechanism needs to be involved to increase the likelihood that the individual's best
interests are actually the major determining factor in the decision-making process").
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child would not be born for another three months. Her husband was out
of town; she had not yet started to buy clothes or diapers for the baby,
and her first Lamaze class was still a month away. Although it was not
yet time, the doctor was informing her that delivery was imminent, and
the baby would probably die or be handicapped as a result. This particu-
lar mother remembered seeing tragically deformed, retarded individuals
with cerebral palsy, and did not wish her child to suffer that misfortune.
The emotional overlay to decision-making at the time of birth de-
creases the chance of an informed decision. Since the decision must be
made quickly, within hours or even minutes of birth, there usually is no
time to call for a second opinion. Any second opinion available will likely
be from another physician in the same hospital who presumably will have
a similar viewpoint to that of the patient's own doctor. Any information
gathered will necessarily be that given by the nurses or physicians pre-
sent. The parent has no independent means of finding out whether differ-
ent physicians or different institutions would handle the situation differ-
ently or might recommend a different course of action.
The rapidity with which the decision must be made also decreases
the chance that it will be one with which the parent will later be comfort-
able. Important decisions are usually made after carefully weighing all
alternatives and mulling over different possible outcomes for the various
choices available. Parents who have never before thought of living with or
raising a handicapped infant cannot be expected to decide whether or not
they want to do so on the spur of the moment.7 7 An initial reaction that
the parents could not cope with raising a handicapped child may turn
into guilt over what is later seen as a selfish response. Likewise, a reaction
such as "we will love our child no matter what" may change when the
parents discover that they have neither the financial nor the emotional
resources to deal with a multiply-handicapped youngster.
Having to make a decision without ever seeing the baby also de-
creases the chance that the parents will later be happy with their'deci-
sion. During the pregnancy, almost all parents envision the birth of a
"perfect" child. Parents who continue to believe that their child is perfect
in spite of being told of the increasing risk of abnormalities, might well
opt for aggressive management to preserve that conception. By opting to
forego resuscitative efforts for their child, parents are acknowledging the
loss of that perfect image. Most parents, it seems, are unwilling -to give up
their vision of a perfect baby. Many parents are unwilling to admit to the
loss of a perfect child even after substantial periods of time. Rarely can a
parent acknowledge the loss immediately after being told that their per-
77 See Fost, supra note 9, at 322 (decision to treat child should not be the same as decision
to raise that child).
HIGH-RISK INFANTS
fect child probably does not exist.7 8 Even in the face of overwhelming
odds, many parents believe that their child will be different, that their
child wiU be the one who defies probability and fully recovers.
Other parents, when they are told that their child has an increased
chance of abnormalities, will envision a pitifully deformed child with no
capacity to enjoy life.7 9 In the actual case related in the Prologue, the
parents were devastated after the birth of their child. When they first
heard their child had "chromosomal abnormalities" and would be se-
verely retarded, their mental image was of a physically deformed infant.
When their daughter was born looking entirely normal, they were con-
vinced that they had erred in opting for an abortion. They were sure that
the doctors had been wrong.
Besides considering an imaginary child, parents are often influenced
by preconceived notions of what the terms "handicapped" and "retarded"
mean.80 If a physician mentions cerebral palsy, parents often think of a
devastatingly handicapped individual with many socially unacceptable
characteristics. They do not know of the thousands of individuals with
cerebral palsy who have only minor physical or mental impairments.
Those individuals do not "stand out" and therefore do not become part of
the average person's perception of what the condition can entail.
After creating an imaginary infant with possibly inaccurately envi-
sioned handicaps, a parent then may consider what it would be like to
raise such a child. Again, their contemplation may be totally erroneous.
Parents may be considering a worst-case scenario that is unreasonably far
from reality. They may also be considering a best-case scenario which is
equally unrealistic. In either case, the decision that they make in the de-
livery room may depend on those inaccurate perceptions.
If a parent considers the worst case, a severely retarded child with
multiple physical handicaps who cannot function independently, parents
may consider whether they have the finances to support their family.
They may also consider the effect that such a child might have on their
other children, if any. They may doubt whether they have the emotional
resources for the afflicted child's needs. After considering the strain on
their family, parents may decide not to resuscitate their baby. But this
baby may not be the child they imagined. This child might turn out en-
tirely normal, or have only minor muscle weaknesses or a minimally low-
78 See id. at 321 (one stage of grieving is denial of reality that "perfect" child does not
exist).
79 See id. at 322.
o See Berseth & Ariagno, Ethical Dilemmas in Perinatal Medicine, 96 J. PEDIATRICS 951,
951 (1980). The lay press has helped to bias parental views with articles on such topics as
"the miracles of modern medicine" and case histories of perfect one-pound "miracle ba-
bies." See Fost, supra note 9, at 322.
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ered IQ. And, even if the child does conform to their worst fears, parents
and family may respond with the same love, support and acceptance they
would ordinarily demonstrate.8'
A parent who considers only the best-case scenario may likewise be
in a regrettable position. By failing to consider the possibility that their
child might not be normal, parents may opt for extraordinary resuscita-
tive measures to save an irreversibly handicapped infant. They may later
lament this decision, believing that they, their family and the child would
have been better off without the resuscitation. If only one parent had
made the initial decision, family harmony may be irreparably disrupted.
Often, because of the stress of delivery, the atmosphere of emer-
gency, or because the decision is necessarily based on inadequate infor-
mation, parental decisions are actually those of their physician or of other
family members.8 2 A parent often consciously defers to the physician's
judgment, but even more often does so subconsciously.83 Physicians fre-
quently have their own biases regarding whether or not to resuscitate,
and their presentation of the facts to the parent may reflect those bi-
ases.8 4 A doctor who stresses the high percentage of retarded babies sur-
viving prematurity with the minuscule chance of being normal may per-
suade a parent to forego resuscitation. A physician can present the same
facts but engender a dissimilar decision by stressing that each child is
different; that some children are totally normal after being born prema-
turely; that there is no way to determine whether this baby will be re-
s See Bartholome, supra note 25, at 910 ("acceptance" of handicapped infant may be very
long process).
' See Duff, Decisions on Death and Dying, 68 PEDIATRICS 908, 908 (1981) ("medical pater-
nalism" preys on hopes of parents).
" See Harrison, Neonatal Intensive Care: Parents' Role in Ethical Decision Making, 13
BIRTH 165, 165-74 (1986). Depending upon how the problem is presented to a parent, he or
she may not even realize that the decision is indeed one of intricate ethical complication. Id.
at 166. The parent may see the decision as a medical one, and thus defer to the physician's
judgment.
A recent study revealed that parents whose child had been removed from life support
believed that they themselves had made the decision. See Walwork & Ellison, Follow-Up of
Families of Neonates in Whom Life Support was Withdrawn, 24 CLIN. PEDIATRICS 14, 14-20
(1985). These parents admitted that the most helpful thing in making the decision was "the
recommendation of the [medical] staff." Id. at 19. Generally, however, a single, unified "staff
opinion" is rendered. Harrison, supra, at 166. The fiction of parental decision-making is
highlighted by the response from the judiciary when parents themselves refuse treatment,
almost uniformly ordering treatment if recommended by a treating physician. Id. at 168.
Parents, therefore, "are essentially at the mercy of the philosophies and motives of their
physicians." Id. at 169.
" See Fost, supra note 9, at 323; Harrison, supra note 83, at 167. The latter states "I can
persuade ninety-nine percent of parents to my way of thinking if I really work at it, even if I
am one hundred percent wrong." Id. (quoting Scanlon, Barbarism, 9 PERINATAL PRESS 103,
103-04 (1985)).
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tarded; and that even if the child has problems later on, the problems are
not necessarily going to be severe. The doctor may thus convince a parent
that the right decision is to provide aggressive resuscitation. A second
opinion might temper excessive physician influence over the parent, but
in the delivery room, as observed previously, there usually is no time to
obtain one.
Similar to physician bias, the preconceived notions of other family
members may help to distort the parents' decision-making process. For
instance, a grandmother whose neighbor had a retarded child thirty years
ago may convince a parent that resuscitating a child who might end up
the same way is a huge error. A grandparent whose strong religious beliefs
demand the preservation of life may persuade his children about to give
birth that resuscitation is morally and ethically required. In neither situa-
tion are the parents actually making the decision themselves.
Parental decision-making even at its best often fails to consider the
rights of the infant because of emotional circumstances and inadequate
information. In the delivery room those failures are multiplied. Such deci-
sions, therefore, should not be allowed to abridge infant rights in this set-
ting. Neonates should almost always be resuscitated at birth. Therapy
can always be discontinued later after considered deliberation when pa-
rental decisions may be more reasoned.
B. Physicians as Decision-Makers
If parents are unsuited to make decisions about the life of their own
infant at birth because of an inability to collect information and because
of emotional conditions, perhaps the physician should be the person to
safeguard the rights of the newborn. 5 Ideally, the doctor should be exper-
ienced with similar cases and should not be swayed by emotional attach-
ments to an unborn child which may be unrealistic. However, a physician
may be torn between his commitment to save life and his commitment to
alleviate suffering. The determination to save a life by resuscitating an
infant may lead to long-term, high-technology intensive care with its at-
tendant suffering. 6 Moreover, the doctor may have biases and precon-
ceived notions that may, consciously or not, slight the life interest of the
child. These biases and notions may differ depending on whether the ob-
stetrician or the pediatrician makes the decision."7
"8 See Smith, supra note 6, at 229 (physician is best protector of child's interests).
" See Stevenson, Ariagno, Kutner, Raffin & Young, supra note 13, at 1909. Infants in a
neonatal intensive care unit are often attached to respirators with tubes in their lungs, tubes
in their stomachs, and multiple intravenous lines, and typically require several needle punc-
tures daily. Id. Even low-risk, relatively healthy premature infants usually require at least
four such punctures a day; extremely sick prematures may need over thirty. Id.
0' See Gilstrap, supra note 18, at 49. Obstetricians have traditionally assumed the decision-
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The obstetrician might be the most logical person to defend the in-
fant's rights. If he is the mother's regular obstetrician, he knows the par-
ents as individuals and has tracked the fetus' development through the
entire pregnancy. The obstetrician should be able to consider both the
infant's chances for survival and the parents' specific needs, and may be
able to understand the effect on the family a defective child might have.
Personal knowledge of the family's financial and emotional resources
available to deal with an adverse outcome, including handicapping condi-
tions and prolonged hospital stays, would probably be understood.
Unfortunately, many obstetricians have never seen their patients
before delivery. Even if this were not so, the obstetrician may have severe
biases that would lead, to inadequate consideration of the infant's rights
when deciding whether or not to resuscitate. Perhaps the strongest bias is
a result of the current malpractice "crisis." Obstetricians who deliver
damaged infants face lawsuits seeking enormous damages. Obstetricians
who deliver dead infants, on the other hand, may face litigation, but for
relatively insignificant awards. As most obstetricians know, a dead baby is
just not worth very much in the eyes of the law. Therefore, in situations
where a decision to resuscitate must be made, an obstetrician might lean
toward not resuscitating, in hope of preventing resuscitation of a child
with handicaps for which they later might be found liable. Some obstetri-
cians, in fact, have been known to "run slowly" to do an emergency caesa-
rean section for fetal distress, apparently hoping that the baby will die
before delivery.
Obstetricians may also be biased because of faulty information. An
obstetrician cannot be expected to remain current in pediatrics as well as
obstetrics. He or she may not know what new therapies are available to
help handicapped individuals or the latest statistics from the neonatal
intensive care unit regarding the fate of babies which it has treated . 8 For
example, an obstetrician may think that a twenty-four week infant has
virtually no chance of survival, when in fact that chance is over ten per-
cent. Even if survival statistics relied upon are correct, the physician may
making and counseling roles in labor and delivery decisions. Id.
- See Goldenberg, supra note 7, at 508 (statistics change rapidly as technology improves).
A physician may not be able to keep up with ever-changing statistical patterns. See Golden-
berg, The Variability of Viability: The Effect of Physicians' Perceptions of Viability on the
Survival of Very Low Birth Weight Infants, 143 AM. J. OBsTET. & GYNECOL. 678, 678-84
(1982). In a survey, as many as forty-eight percent of doctors admitted either over- or un-
derestimating the gestational age at which child would have fifty percent chance of survival
given aggressive care. Id. at 680. Moreover, even if physicians are aware of the statistics,
they may not know how to apply them. See Bergman & Pantell, The Impact of Reading a
Clinical Study on Treatment Decisions of Physicians and Residents, 61 J. MED. EDUc. 380,
380-81 (1986) (doctors may change clinical management on basis of incorrect interpretation
of data).
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underestimate the actual gestational age of a particular fetus.89 A decision
against resuscitation may thus be made when resuscitation would in fact
be appropriate.90 The survival of an infant may, therefore, directly de-
pend on the obstetrician's factual information.91
Obstetricians may also have personal biases that may lead to a pater-
nalistic decision. For example, an obstetrician may feel that the burden of
raising a child with spina bifida is too great for any parent, and the
trauma of being a child with this condition is too great for any youngster.
She or he may thus manipulate such an infant at delivery to decrease the
newborn's chances for survival.
If the obstetrician is too misinformed and biased to make an accept-
able decision, perhaps the pediatrician should decide. The pediatrician
present at the delivery is likely a neonatologist specializing in newborn
intensive care and disorders. Because the pediatrician's field is newborn
intensive care, this doctor should be the most knowledgeable about the
actual overall prognosis for a particular child. He or she should know if
the child has any chance of survival at all, and if any therapy is available
to increase such chances.9"
If survival alone were the issue, the pediatrician may be the best de-
cision-maker. However, even experienced pediatricians have opted not to
resuscitate a "non-viable" infant who later survives.93 In one instance,
twins were delivered at twenty-five weeks by caesarean section. The ne-
onatologist initially did not resuscitate the first twin because he thought
it too immature to survive. He then decided the second twin was viable
and did resuscitate it. Having resuscitated the second, the doctor realized
his inconsistency and finally resuscitated the first as well.94
When quality of life is permitted to influence the decision, the pedia-
89 See Hershel, supra note 18, at 156.
"o See Goldenberg, supra note 88, at 683. On the other hand, if the obstetrician incorrectly
believes that an infant has a high chance of survival he or she may be overly aggressive in
resuscitating a neonate who in fact has only a minimal chance of survival. Id.
"l See Goldenberg, supra note 7, at 508.
9' See Johnson, "Baby Doe" Rules: There Are Alternatives, 138 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 523, 525
(1984). With rapid improvements in medical technology, though, a single physician may be
unable to prognosticate without consultation with other specialists. Id. at 524.
" See Welch & Phillips, supra note 11, at 132.
A similar case was reported in 1981. Parents and physicians decided not to resuscitate
cojoined ("Siamese") twins, believing them not to be viable. The twins survived without
resuscitation and were later given resuciative therapy. See Taub, Medical Decision-Making
for Defective Infants by the Federal Government, 47 CONN. MED. 413, 413-16 (1983).
Other instances where a physician may err in her or his assessment of viability is where
an infant has multiple deformities, which may appear to be lethal anomalies leading the
physician not to resuscitate. See Setzer, Intrauterine Positional Deformations Masquerad-
ing as Multiple Congenital Malformations, 138 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 642, 642-44 (1984).
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trician may still be at a disadvantage. 95 Unless a pediatrician participates
in follow-up care of high-risk nursery "graduates" or unless extensive
reading on follow-up is performed,9 the pediatrician may be subject to
the same personal biases as are parents. The pediatrician's perception of
long-term outcome of a child with spina bifida, for example, may be influ-
enced by his or her own exposure 97 to a small sample of infants with
spina bifida, rather than by any objective assessment of infants with
spina bifida in general."8 Some physicians, like a portion of the general
public, believe that infants with this condition are better off dead. This
belief is contrary to statistics that show most children with spina bifida
have normal intelligence and are capable of independent life and mean-
ingful human relations."
A pediatrician's personal experience may be useful in helping to con-
sider how an infant's survival will affect the family, if this consideration is
permissible. A pediatrician may have seen how similarly situated families
react to and deal with handicapped infants. If a child is likely to have
severe mental and motor deficiencies, a pediatrician may be able to pre-
dict whether or not a particular family is likely to be able to support the
child either financially or emotionally, based upon what other similar
families have been able to do.
In most instances, the pediatrician in the delivery room does not
know the family.' Since this doctor does not have a relationship with
96 See Todres, supra note 25, at 646 (pediatricians today de-emphasize quality of life in
decision-making, unlike doctors in the past). A recent survey revealed that physicians are
more likely to intervene medically for infants in cases of extreme prematurity or serious
anomalies than their counterparts in the Sixties and Seventies. Id.
See Ellison, A Scoring System to Predict Outcome Following Neonatal Seizures, 99 J.
PEDITRmCS 455, 455-59 (1981) (reviewing early neonatal seizures or brain bleeding as
predictors of later development).
97 See, e.g., Berseth, Longitudinal Development in Pediatric Residents of Attitudes To-
ward Neonatal Resuscitation, 140 AM. J. Dis. CHILD. 766, 768-69 (exposure may have been
during residency training; may be an increasing reluctance to resuscitate high-risk infants in
third year residents from first year interns). Many pediatric hospital admissions are for
high-risk infants that have not done well. Id. These admissions may be the only exposure
residents have to such children once they leave the hospital, coloring the residents' percep-
tion of how well high-risk infants do. Id.
" See Wolraich, Pediatricians' Perceptions of Mentally Retarded Individuals, 80 PEDIAT-
mcs 643, 649 (1987) (pediatricians seem to have lower expectation of performance for re-
tarded individuals than other professionals who work extensively with handicapped).
See Freeman, Early Management and Decision Making for the Treatment of Myelomen-
ingocele: A Critique, 73 PEDIATRICS 564, 564-66 (1984).
100 In most cases, a neonatologist is called for specific problems occurring during labor, or at
most a few days or weeks before delivery. Most neonatologists do not practice general pedi-
atrics, and would only be familiar with families who have a known high-risk fetus. See
Green, The Prenatal Visit (Report of Committee on Psychosocial Aspects of Child and
Family Health), 73 PEDIATRICS 561, 561-62 (1984) (only twenty-two percent of expectant
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the particular family, he or she cannot really know what their religious,
moral and ethical convictions are, but can only guess how the family
would deal with an abnormal infant based on whatever brief conversa-
tions take place.
By not knowing the parents well, however, a physician may be able to
consider more objectively the infant's rights and interests. Since the doc-
tor can only guess as to the parents' ability to cope with their infant,
perhaps the pediatrician can best support the infant's interests without
considering those of the parents. The pediatrician may be able to concen-
trate on the child's chances for survival without considering its "quality
of life," who will tend to the child, or who will be paying for its care.
Unfortunately, like obstetricians, pediatricians also have emotional
and intellectual biases and prejudices. Neonatologists in particular often
believe strongly in life and in their own abilities to sustain it in marginal
cases."'1 Without this type of conviction, physicians might never have al-
lowed medical technology to advance to the point of being able to save
one-pound infants, or to transplant hearts into malformed newborns.1 0
2
However, this "Superman syndrome"1 0 leads many neonatologist to favor
aggressive therapy which laymen might consider excessively "heroic. ' ' 04
Where to draw the line between extraordinary and routine therapy
may differ both between different physicians and laypersons.10 5 The
boundary may also change through time. For example, the use of artificial
ventilation was at one time considered an extraordinary procedure, used
only on rare occasions in an academic setting. Today, assisted ventilation
is standard therapy, used for any type of infant who cannot breath effec-
tively. The question of assisted ventilation now is whether this therapy is
justified for certain categories of infants-prematures, newborns with
otherwise lethal anomalies, and the like. The answer in any particular
instance will usually depend on the personal bias of the physician.
The spectre of medical malpractice liability also haunts pediatri-
couples had seen pediatrician prior to delivery; figure probably lower in clinic population).
101 See Berseth & Ariagno, Ethical Dilemmas in Perinatal Medicine, 96 J. PEDIATRICS 951,
951 (1980) (in Housestaff in particular, "death is seen as personal physician failure.").
10, See Harrison, supra note 83, at 167 (citing Dr. Phibb's belief that one justification for
this type of extraordinary effort is to improve "knowledge and skills" of physicians).
103 See Whitfield, The Application of Hospice Concepts to Neonatal Care, 136 Am. J. Dis.
CHELD. 421, 421-24 (1982) (physicians and other neonatal intensive care unit ["NICU"] staff
often feel great sense of failure when unable to save life).
104 See Lumley, Does This Work?, 79 PEDIATRICS 1040, 1040-44 (1987) (noting that physi-
cians often "feel better" if "heroic" therapy was tried before infant died).
108 Pope Pius XII defined "heroic" care as that "which cannot be obtained by or used with-
out excessive expense, pain, or other inconvenience, or where, if used, would not offer a
reasonable hope of benefit." See Taub, supra note 94, at 414 (quoting Papal Allocution to a
Congress of Anesthetists, Nov. 24, 1957, ACTA APOSTOLICA SFDIS 1027 (1957)).
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cians.106 The concern over suits for damaged as opposed to dead children
is not as acute as it is for obstetricians, however. An infant requiring vig-
orous delivery room resuscitation is more likely to be the product of ob-
stetrical mismanagement than pediatric. Pediatricians, nonetheless, may
question the validity of consent obtained during an emotional period.
Consent for treatment or for withholding resuscitation may not be consid-
ered "informed" if the parents are distraught, the mother is in pain or
sedated, or the consent is obtained hastily. A pediatrician may worry that
a suit will later be filed no matter what she or he does. If the infant is
resuscitated and problems later develop, the parents may claim that they
did not understand the full extent of the problem when they agreed to
the procedure. If resuscitation is withheld, parents may later assert that
they did not realize the possibility that their infant might survive any-
how, in an even worse condition. If their infant dies because resuscitation
is withheld, the parents may claim that they did not realize that the in-
fant could have been normal.
Bias, either obstetrical or pediatric, makes physician delivery room
resuscitation decisions suspect. Hasty decisions may be particularly af-
fected by unconscious motives. Physicians should therefore resuscitate al-
most all infants in the delivery room. Later, after considered deliberation,
their biases may be less evident and decisions to withdraw therapy from a
child may be more satisfactory.
C. Decision-Making in Concert
Since decision-making by parents alone often leads to unsatisfactory
results, and decision-making by doctors usually leads to biased conclu-
sions, perhaps a better outcome would be obtained by parents and physi-
cians acting together as a group. Research on group decision-making sup-
ports the belief that group decisions are often better accepted and based
on more information than are individual decisions.107 The method proba-
bly most used in practice is some variant of group interactive decision-
making.
As stated previously, parents often consider their own interests above
those of their infant. The physician, if a pediatrician, is more likely to
consider the infant's interests before those of the parents. A joint parent-
physician decision, it would appear, would balance the competing forces.
However, even if a decision is personally acceptable to the decision-mak-
1" See Harrison, supra note 83, at 167 ("defensive medicine" may require aggressive ther-
apy in all cases); Fost, supra note 9, at 323 (health care professionals involved in decision
making "are at risk for civil and criminal liability").
107 See R. Cooper, Joint Decision Making in the NICU: Is it Group Behavior? (1988 ed.)
(unpublished manuscript).
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ers, it may not be a legally acceptable one. Moreover, severe conflict may
arise if parents and physicians disagree, or if nurses disagree with the
decision made without nursing input. For example, in the case related in
the Prologue, the nurses felt very uncomfortable with the final decision.
It was the nurses who cared for the mother and who attended to the in-
fant after delivery, but they were denied the opportunity to participate in
the decision-making process. Some of the nurses had disagreed with the
decision to abort, while others were uncomfortable with the implied
agreement that no resuscitation would be performed if the baby were
born alive.
Where conflict develops, the solution may end up being one that
leaves everyone unsatisfied. The relationship between the doctor and the
parents will be disturbed, as well as those between the nurses, parents,
and doctor. The outcome will be that care to either the infant or the
mother will suffer.
In an attempt to solve some of the problems of group conflict or of
bias of the group participants, ethics committees have been developed. 0 8
These committees that have a wide range of participants including medi-
cal professionals, lay persons, handicapped individuals, religious counsel-
ors and legal advisors, can consider parental and infant interests and doc-
tor's opinions more objectively. In 1984, the American Academy of
Pediatrics promulgated the Guidelines for Infant Bioethics Commit-
tees.'0 ' The committees were envisioned to provide educational resources,
institutional guidelines and consultation for individual cases.1 " Under
these recommendations, the ultimate objective of the committees was to
"facilitate consensus about the interests of the infant."''
The theoretical value of an ethics committee may be overestimated.
The medical information about a particular case will be derived from the
doctors involved." 2 Most ethics committees do not research a case inde-
pendently. Therefore, the information presented to them will necessarily
be biased according to the inclinations of the presenter. The committee,
hearing that a child "might turn out entirely normal," may feel differ-
ently about resuscitating that child than if the committee hears that the
108 See Rosner, Hospital Medical Ethics Committees: A Review of Their Development, 253
J. A.M.A. 2693, 2693-97 (1985). One of the earliest attempts at forming ethics committees
was in 1971, in Catholic hospitals. Id. at 2693. These committees blossomed after the Karen
Quinlan case and the "Baby Doe" regulations in the 1970's. Id. at 2694.
109 See Weil, Guidelines for Infant Bioethics Committees (Report of the Infant Bioethics
Task Force and Consultants), 74 PEDIATxRcs 306, 306-10 (1984).
11o See id. at 307.
.. Id. at 309.
.. See Johnson, The "Baby Doe" Rule: Is It All Bad?, 73 PDLDTRaCS 729, 729-30 (1984) (if
all decisions made by committee, only way physician can remain infant's advocate may be
through input into committee).
33 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
child "has almost no chance of survival." Both statements may be saying
the same thing, but the reaction to the facts may be entirely different.
Similarly, if the parents participate in the ethics committee discus-
sion, the committee may become biased in favor of their interests. Par-
ents who are thoughtful, caring and concerned about the type of life their
child will lead may engender a different response from the ethics commit-
tee than would a young professional couple who demonstrates a lack of
available time to care properly for an infant with serious medical compli-
cations. Therefore, depending on the parent, children with the same
physiological problems may receive different treatment because the ethics
committee favored one set of parents.
Inherent bias may exist in individual members of ethics committees,
just as it exists in parents or physicians. Prior exposure to handicapped
individuals and their families, or relevant hospital procedures may influ-
ence an individual committee members' reaction. An individual with a
strong influence on the committee or with unusual powers of persuasion
may sway the committee to his or her point of view.
Bias of the committee may be controlled, however, if the group is
given the opportunity to address the bias issue.' With larger groups, the
bias of an individual may be recognized and become less influential." 4
Since ethics committees are typically made up of five or more members,
they may be less influenced by the bias of individual members than is the
small group of just parent and physician.
Even though bias may be limited, the value of an ethics committee in
the delivery room may be impaired by the timing involved. Most delivery
room resuscitation decisions are made within hours or even minutes. To
expect a committee to convene on such short notice is unrealistic. There-
fore, in most high-risk situations, use of an ethics committee is
impractical.
An ethics committee may, however, be useful in determining the
standards to be used in making delivery room decisions.'" Such a com-
mittee could develop general guidelines that could be followed in individ-
ual circumstances. For instance, the committee could develop procedures
to be followed when a genetic amniocentesis reveals that a fetus exhibits
trisomy-18 and the parents request abortion. The committee recommen-
dations might include consultation with a pediatrician to discuss the par-
"' See Weil, supra note 20, at 521.
11 But see Fetal Experimentation, supra note 34, at 1094 (little uniformity in composition,
authority, or effectiveness of these committees).
" See Weil, supra note 20, at 522 (four functions of ethics committees are establishment of
general policies, procedures and tentative guidelines; provision of general education pro-
grams; reviewing physician-parent performance; and emergency consultation). But see
Veatch, supra note 21, at 2298 (suggesting exact role of ethics committees is unclear).
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ents' feelings concerning resuscitation if the infant is born alive, a mini-
mal infant weight below which resuscitation should not be undertaken, or
a minimum level of resuscitation that should be applied generically. The
recommendations might include a flexible standard where the committee
would review the parents' financial condition, the length of anticipated
hospital care for the infant, and the extent of the child's probable defects.
In this scenario, a doctor and parent would have a blueprint of the type
of factors they should consider and the weight to be given to each. The
recommendations might be based on a "typical" situation. For example,
such guidelines might outline procedures for management of a child with
Down's Syndrome, or one for management of a premature infant deliv-
ered after elective abortion, or one for an infant whose heart rate had
been low before delivery.
The problem with the ethics committee process is that the recom-
mendations promulgated are not individual-specific. If the recommenda-
tion is based on a "typical" case, it may simply be inadequate. A particu-
lar baby with Down's Syndrome may have only minimal deficiencies. This
premature may have a normal development. A decision based on statistics
of what a "typical" infant is expected to do may be unfair to the individ-
ual child. Just as statistics are of limited use in the courtroom to prove
the guilt of a particular individual,11 their role in the delivery room in
predicting the development of a particular child should likewise be se-
verely restricted.
Moreover, although the committee's recommendation is not legally
binding, it may give a physician a false sense of security. If the recom-
mendation is procedural, the parents and the physician may get an incor-
rect sense that what they decide is legally and morally appropriate. If the
law requires only careful consideration of infant and parental interests
before making a decision, reliance on ethics committee guidelines may in
fact be protective.1 1 7 However, if the law actually requires that the rights
of the different parties both must be preserved, following guidelines may
be no defense if an infant's rights have been denied by failing to resusci-
tate. Moreover, the moral decision is by nature not one that can be dele-
gated to a committee. A decision does not take on the trappings of moral-
ity merely because a committee condones the activity considered. It only
I e See, e.g., People v. Harbold, 124 Ill. App.3d 363, 366-69, 464 N.E.2d 734, 735-36 (1984)
(testimony that statistical probability of accidental match between defendant's blood type
and sample found on victim was 1 in 500 improperly admitted).
117 See Leiken, supra note 22, at 957 (ethics committee determinations should be admissible
as evidence in court); Michels & Oliver, Human Rights Consultation: A 12-Year Experience
of a Pediatric Bioethics Committee, 78 PEDiATiacs 566, 570-72 (1986) (noting one case
where consultation was requested to protect against legal proceedings). See also Johnson,
supra note 92, at 526 (ethics committees may just "rubber stamp" decisions already made in
routine fashion).
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becomes morally correct when it conforms to the beliefs of the individuals
involved, and with societal norms. 118 A committee of individuals in one
hospital cannot be expected to define what those norms are.
Decision-making in concert, it seems, is ineffective in the delivery
room setting. Conflicts between physician, nurse and parents should not
be resolved hastily, and ethics committees cannot function under emer-
gency conditions. General guidelines developed by ethics committees can
only be applied if a situation has been evaluated sufficiently to assure
that it falls within the committees' parameters. Thus, decisions to with-
hold therapy from a newborn should not be made in the delivery room,
even under the auspices of group assent. Almost every infant should be
resuscitated initially; treatment may later be withdrawn once all consider-
ations can be fully evaluated.
D. Decision-Making by the Legal System
Because decisions made by individuals suffer from bias and misinforma-
tion, and since decisions made or assisted by groups suffer from possible
bias, misinformation, and ultimate illegality and immorality, perhaps de-
cisions should be made by the legal system. Legislative or judicial solu-
tions would at least have the benefit of legality,1 19 and doctors could be
more comfortable with the decision in terms of liability. Both legislative
and judicial intervention in newborn resuscitation have been attempted.
Legislative intervention was first positively applied to the area of in-
fant care in the 1980's in the case of a child born with with Down's Syn-
drome and esophageal atresia. 120 The infant's parents and physician
opted to forego surgical correction for this child who would ultimately be
retarded to an unknown degree. A complaint filed by an attending nurse
118 See Neuspiel & David, supra note 64, at 759. Early, subtle changes in individual and
societal attitudes may be worrisome. Using the Nazi brutalities as a model, Alexander noted:
The beginnings at first were merely a subtle shift in emphasis in the basic attitude of
the physicians. It started with the acceptance of the attitude, basic in the euthanasia
movement, that there is such a thing as a life not worthy to be lived. This attitude in
its early stages concerned itself merely with the severely and chronically sick. Gradu-
ally the sphere of those to be included in the category was enlarged to encompass the
socially unproductive, the ideologically unwanted, the racially unwanted and finally
all non-Germans.
Id.
1' See Fetal Experimentation, supra note 34, at 1073-80.
"' See Coulter, The "Baby Doe" Dilemma: Withholding Treatment From Disabled In-
fants, 1987 MICH. B.J. 40, 40.
Esophageal atresia is a birth defect in which the main passage from the mouth to the
stomach is undeveloped. Secretions from the mouth have nowhere to go and often overflow
into the lungs, causing pneumonia. Without surgery, a child with this condition cannot eat
and will slowly starve to death.
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resulted in a judicial opinion, In re Infant Doe,"'1 which reasoned that it
was not the province of the court to interfere in these decisions. Baby
Doe later starved to death.
After an enormous public outcry, Congress enacted the "Baby Doe
Regulation" ["the Act"] of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. This regulation
forbade withholding treatment from individuals solely because of their
handicaps if treatment was "otherwise appropriate." To assure compli-
ance with the Act, health care facilities were required to post notices de-
tailing the Act's requirements, with a "hotline" number to be called by
anyone with knowledge of infringements.
While on its face a giant step forward in support of infant's rights,
the Act was in fact intrusive, unclear, and ultimately unworkable.12 What
exactly did "handicapped" mean? When the medical condition was ulti-
mately tied to the handicap, was treatment still required? For example, if
Baby Doe had not had Down's Syndrome, she most likely would not have
had a surgically correctable lesion either. Did the Act require treatment
only if a medically correctable lesion was something separate from the
handicap? What if the "handicap" was a lethal anomaly? 2 s Did associ-
ated medical difficulties still need correction? For example, a child with a
malformed heart might also have pneumonia, or an intestinal blockage. If
the child would die within days anyway, did the Act require treating the
pneumonia or the intestinal problem?
In Bowen v. University Hospital Assn.,"' the Supreme Court held
that the Baby Doe regulations were partly unconstitutional. In Bowen,
parents of an infant with a congenital defect decided against surgical cor-
rection.125 The Department of Health and Human Services sought to in-
tervene on behalf of the infant, citing the Baby Doe regulation. The
No. GU 8204-004A (Monroe Co. Cir. Ct., April 12, 1982), writ of mandamus denied sub.
nom., State ex. rel. Infant Doe v. Baker, No. 482 S.140 (Ind. Sup. Ct., May 27, 1982), cert.
denied sub. nom., Infant Doe v. Bloomington Hosp., 464 U.S. 961 (1983).
"' See Shapiro & Rosenberg, The Effect of Federal Regulations Regarding Handicapped
Newborns: A Case Report, 252 J. A.M.A. 2031, 2031-33 (1984) (noting physicians, hospital
personnel and families all felt normal and private function had been disrupted by Act);
Strain, The Decision to Forego Life-Sustaining Treatment for Seriously Ill Newborns, 72
PEDIATRICS 572, 573 (1983) (government through Act intruded into "a very sensitive area of
decision-making.").
Physicians generally disliked the initial regulation. Frequently cited were concerns for
the disruption of the doctor-patient relationship, disruption of the family unit and the
"placement of ethical decision[-]making in the hands of one or several minor bureaucrats."
Berseth, A Neonatologist Looks at the Baby Doe Rule: Ethical Decisions by Edict, 72 PzI -
ATRiCS 428, 428 (1983).
12' See Taub, supra note 94, at 415 (according to Surgeon General, regulation not intended
to apply to terminally ill).
-- 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
125 Id. at 621.
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Court held that since no parental consent had been given for the surgery,
the infant was not in fact "otherwise qualified" for the procedure.'26 It
was not the handicap of the infant that precluded surgery, but the lack of
parental consent itself, and the regulation was held not to apply. Justice
Stevens, writing for a plurality, concluded that the regulations were not
authorized by section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. First, the regulations
required state agencies to demonstrate that they were in compliance with
the regulations,' 27 but impermissibly required state agencies to enforce
compliance by other recipients of federal aid. " Secondly, the regulation
authorized investigations when no evidence of discrimination on the basis
of handicap was evident. In Bowen, no evidence existed that the hospital
refused to treat the infant because of the infant's handicap; rather, they
refused treatment for lack of consent only. Under the Baby Doe rules as
promulgated, handicapped individuals had an "absolute right" to be
treated in a hospital receiving federal funds.2 9 If hospitals did not vigor-
ously pursue treatment, they could be denied federal funding. The legis-
lation was intended to protect equal rights, not to develop new ones.3 0
Congress subsequently amended the Baby Doe rules. The new regu-
lations provided guidelines for decision-making and suggested the format
and role of infant care review boards. In effect, the regulations provided
directions for decision-making in the manner in which it had traditionally
been done in the nursery. The physician was permitted to make the as-
sessment of the effect of treatment, and the parents and physician, often
in consultation with a committee, could make the ultimate decision as to
what therapy, if any, would be given. The new regulations permitted
withholding treatment for "irreversibly comatose" infants, for infants
who would die no matter what therapy was given, for infants for whom
therapy would be "futile," and for infants for whom therapy would be
"virtually futile" because the therapy itself would be inhumane.
Since the legislative model of decision-making is the codification of
what has already been done in practice, it cannot be applied satisfactorily
to the delivery room. In emergency situations, these decision-making
methods have already proven themselves inadequate.
Judicial intervention on a case-by-case basis would likewise be inade-
quate. Although a court would be able to address each case individually,
considering both the rights of the child and the parents, a judicial deci-
sion suffers from the same defects as other decisions made by individuals.
A judges' own bias would interfere, the medical facts and prognosis avail-
Ill Id. at 631.
'" Id. at 639.
18 Id. at 642.
12 Id. at 641.
130 Id.
HIGH-RISK INFANTS
able would be those of a biased physician, and the social or family situa-
tion would appear only as presented by the parents or a third party.
Moreover, in a delivery room atmosphere, there would be no time to call a
judge and have a decision rendered before the child would in fact need to
be resuscitated. Judicial intervention in the delivery room has been at-
tempted in cases of fetal distress, where courts have ordered caesarean
sections against the parent's wishes. The results have been disappointing.
In cases where it has been applied, by the time delivery could have been
effectuated, the infant was already damaged, vaginal delivery had already
occurred resulting in a healthy infant, or both the infant and the mother
died. Even if judicial intervention is the option most likely to result in an
acceptable decision, it usually is too little and too late. In order to be
effective, there would have to be a judge in every delivery room standing
by to make timely decisions.
Since judges are not available for every delivery, almost all infants
should be resuscitated in the delivery room. If judicial intervention is
needed, it can be obtained later in order to evaluate withdrawal of the
infant from therapy. Once resuscitation is complete, the decision to with-
draw therapy is usually non-emergent. All aspects of the infant's progno-
sis and care can be considered at length.
E. The Infant as Decision-Maker
Parents, physicians, committees, and legal mechanisms have been
proven to be inadequate to make life-and-death decisions in the delivery
room. The only decision-maker left is the person who has perhaps the
most interest in the outcome: the infant. The infant is the one whose
rights will be lost forever if a decision is made to forego that infant's
resuscitation in the delivery room.
The infant may be allowed, after a fashion, to be his own decision-
maker. The infant's interest in survival may be inferred from his reaction
to treatment. 18 1 An infant in the nursery who is not responding to or who
is deteriorating despite aggressive treatment may be said to be demon-
strating an interest in "refusing" further treatment.
In the delivery room, the infant may respond readily to resuscitation
or may fail to respond at all. If the infant responds, the other decision-
makers will then have time to consider more carefully the ultimate deci-
sion of whether care should be continued. If the infant fails to respond to
resuscitation, the caretakers have not denied the child his right to life. By
initiating therapy and allowing the infant a chance to respond, the care-
takers are giving the infant the opportunity to exercise that right. There-
fore, almost all infants should be resuscitated in the delivery room. The
181 See R. Cooper, supra note 107 (describing infant as part of decision-making group).
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infants who survive can later be evaluated in the nursery. An infant may
later be withdrawn from therapy after careful deliberation of all factors
including that infant's response to various treatment programs.
PROTECTING INFANT RIGHTS: HOW TO MAKE THE DECISION
A. The Basis of the Decision: Resolving Who Will Be Decision-Maker
Perhaps a decision-maker could more easily be identified if the bases
of the decision were clearly identified. What needs to be considered in
making the decision?"3 2 If it is purely the chance of survival of the infant,
then it is the pediatrician who has all the information that is needed. If it
is purely the wishes of the parents, then the parents alone can make the
decision. In China, for example, where parental rights are considered par-
amount, a parent can decide not to have a child resuscitated or treated
for any reason whatsoever, with no questions asked. If it is a societal/
economic cost-benefit analysis, conceivably Congress or state legislatures
could best set the standards for resuscitation. If it is the "best interests"
of the child, then the choice of decision-maker is more difficult, because
personal biases start to enter the picture. 3 ' Likewise, decisions based on
family interests, the quality of the infant's life or the inferred wishes of
the child require difficult choices as to who will act as decision-maker.
Current laws do not adequately provide standards for decision-mak-
ing even outside the delivery room."3 4 Courts have looked at the criteria
for decision-making under two circumstances similar to the delivery
room. First, the Supreme Court implied standards for resuscitation in de-
cisions relating to abortion. In Planned Parenthood Assn. of Kansas City
v. Ashcroft,"s6 the Court found constitutional a state law requiring a sec-
ond physician to be present at all post-viability abortions.' So, if a state
can require a physician to resuscitate an infant in furtherance of its
''compelling interest in protecting the lives of viable fetuses," presumably
the requirement for resuscitation is viability alone. 137
The second instance in which courts have looked at standards for life
'n See Faix, Triploidy: Case Report of a Live-Born Male and an Ethical Dilemma, 74
PEDLWATicS 296, 297-300 (1984). Three historical guidelines for decision-making have been
noted by some commentators: "(1) save or preserve life at all costs, (2) relieve suffering, and
(3) do no harm." Id. at 298.
13 See Neuspiel & David, supra note 64, at 757. The authors caution that "'death with
dignity' and 'quality of life' concepts have been introduced as thinly veiled justifications for
plans that are at root economically motivated." Id. Although couched in terms of patient
interest, the decision in fact reflects no "concern for the victims of these policies." Id.
1 See id. at 758.
1 462 U.S. 476 (f983).
Id. at 486.
187 See id. at 485.
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support is in cases of the withdrawal of such support. In In re Quinlan,38
the New Jersey Supreme Court allowed the substituted judgment of a
comatose woman's parents to authorize removal of life support equip-
ment. In In re Conroy," 9 the same court added an objective test to be
used when it was unclear what such an individual would decide. In the
objective test, the decision-maker had to weigh the net benefit of life
against the net burden of treatment. " " Similarly, in Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz,' the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts al-
lowed a third party to postulate what a retarded individual would have
decided if he had been competent to do so.
The third circumstance in which courts have examined related deci-
sion-making issues is in the nursery for non-treatment decisions.1 4 2 In
those cases, notably those involving Indiana's "Baby Doe""" and New
York's "Baby Jane Doe, "14 the courts declined to discuss the logic be-
hind the decisions and focused entirely on their procedural aspects.
B. Viability Standard: Is Quality of Life Included?
In Roe v. Wade,1'5 the Supreme Court adopted the standard of via-
bility for determining when a state's interest in protecting life outweighed
the mother's interest in privacy. In his opinion, Justice Blackmun defined
"viability" as the stage at which the fetus had the "capability of meaning-
ful life outside the mother's womb." 6 The time in gestation when a fetus
became viable could vary as technology varied.
Today, as physicians are more able to rescue smaller babies and treat
them through to maturity, the point of viability is getting earlier and ear-
lier in the pregnancy. The Roe Court left the definition of "meaningful"
unclear. Many physicians have interpreted "meaningful" to include a
quality of life determination. Thus, if the fetus had a genetic defect that
would result in severe mental retardation, physicians often considered
-- 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1974), cert. denied sub. nom., Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
19 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
14 See Coulter, supra note 120, at 45.
m 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
14. See Coulter, supra note 120, at 45.
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denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983). See also United States v. University Hosp. of State Univ. of
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410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16 Id. at 163.
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that fetus "non-viable." By this definition, the life of a retarded infant is
not "meaningful".
The Court had not intended this result, however. In Colautti v.
Franklin,'147 Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority in clarifying this
aspect of Roe. The potentiality of "meaningful" life meant "not merely
momentary survival."148 Thus, only length and not "quality" of survival
should be considered. Viability under Roe included only chance of sur-
vival, determined by a physician. Once the child is born, no one needs to
decide if the child can survive. The child demonstrates its ability to sur-
vive by its continued existence. "9 The question then becomes, should the
infant be allowed to try?
Although the Supreme Court has excluded quality of life as a crite-
rion in abortion decisions, it has permitted it in the withdrawal-of-sup-
port context. In cases of older children and adults, decisions might con-
sider the individual's life prior to the need for any decision. Thus, in the
Quinlan case, the comatose woman's parents were allowed to factor in her
former lifestyle in making their surrogate decision. In Conroy, the deci-
sion-maker was permitted to balance the benefit the retarded individual
derived from life against the burden of a life undergoing constant treat-
ment.150 These methods obviously suffer from the possibility of a wrong
assumption about the quality of the patient's life.' 5' In the case of a new-
born in the delivery room, there is no way to know what the infant's life
will be like. Decision-makers can only guess as to the quality of life the
neonate will enjoy. They must assume that this baby will be like most
other infants similarly afflicted. Because of the inherent difficulties in
prognostication, 52 this assumption is dangerous.
Since neither an objective test nor a substituted-judgment test func-
tion in the delivery room, perhaps a more practical test should be ap-
plied. The "Baby Doe" regulations propose to remove from the decision
of whether the baby should live the consideration of a child's potential
handicap. One author has labelled this the "non-discrimination" ap-
proach.' s5 Under this paradigm, a decision-maker must determine what
would be appropriate for the child if he did not have the handicapping
condition.
"4 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
See id. at 397.
See, e.g., Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138, 142 (D. D.C. 1946) (in early case allowing
recovery for prenatal torts, court noted infant's viability was self-proving feature of develop-
ment). See also Note, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal
Rights?, 92 DICK. L. REV. 691, 694 (1988) (reviewing concept of viability after Bonbrest).
'" See Smith, supra note 33, at 774-75.
See id. at 782.
I See id.
153 See Coulter, supra note 120, at 44.
HIGH-RISK INFANTS
The non-discrimination approach, unfortunately, is also unworkable
in the delivery room. Most resuscitation decisions arise because of the
handicapping condition. Most premature infants, for example, need to be
resuscitated because they have immature lungs which cannot function in-
dependently. Under the "Baby Doe" approach, decision-makers would
have to resuscitate all premature infants simply because they would have
to resuscitate a full-term baby whose lungs could not function indepen-
dently. But this approach breaks down if the infant, actually a fetus, has
only reached a gestational age of twenty-two weeks. At this stage, the
infant cannot breathe on its own. Generally speaking, that is the only
reason a twenty-two week neonate would need to be resuscitated in the
delivery room. But such a child has absolutely no chance of survival, be-
cause its lungs are undeveloped and incapable of sustaining life even with
support. The child's "handicapping condition," therefore, is intimately
bound up with his or her need for resuscitation. Denying resuscitation in
this context would not be discriminating against the handicapped; it
would merely consist of recognizing futility.
The Child Abuse Amendment of 1984 focused on remedying the
problems inherent in this approach. The Amendment's approach allowed
specific exceptions to the otherwise mandatory provision of medical care.
The exceptions include situations where the treatment would be virtually
futile and inhumane. Thus, in the case of the twenty-two week fetus, re-
suscitation would not be mandated. But what about an asphyxiated new-
born where the outcome is uncertain? Since most severely asphyxiated
infants do not survive, treatment could be considered "virtually futile."
However, some do survive, with abnormalities absent or minimal. Is it
inhumane to provide treatment in an attempt to give a baby an opportu-
nity for survival? The standard proposed is unclear, and thus unreliable.
The President's Commission attempted to clarify the concept of "hu-
mane" in its reliance on a "best interests of the child" standard. Under
this standard, a competent decision-maker could consider the "net bene-
fit" to the child in deciding whether to forego medical treatment. This
benefit had to be examined from the child's perspective, excluding con-
siderations of the family's emotional and financial burdens and the so-
called "burden on society." Unfortunately, this standard suffers even
more from ambiguity than any of the others preceding. It depends on who
the decision-maker is and what that particular person or persons consider
a "net benefit." This term is left undefined; so, in fact, is the term "com-
petent decision-maker." 1 " Similarly situated infants in different hospitals
could be treated differently under the same standard of decision-making.
Comparable unequal decision-making would occur under the tests us-
1 See id.
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ing financial, social, or emotional considerations. In each test, the decision
might be clear in an individual case, but children with similar afflictions
would end up being treated differently depending on the circumstances of
their birth. A child with wealthy parents who were anxious to raise their
child no matter what his or her handicap might be resuscitated, while a
child of a single parent with no resources might be left to die.
CONCLUSION
None of the proposed tests for withdrawal of therapy from incompe-
tents or for the initiation of treatment in disabled infants can be easily
applied when it comes to the delivery room. All use "quality of life" as a
factor to some degree. Even the non-discrimination approach, purporting
to exclude disabilities in decision-making, in fact allows quality of life to
be considered. In the delivery room, as elsewhere, the ability to predict
what life will hold for a particular infant is limited. A child who appears
to have chromosomal defects may merely have positional deformations. A
fetus that appears from its size to be in its twenty-third week may in fact
be in its twenty-sixth.
Allowing quality of life to enter into decision-making complicates the
choice of who will act as decision-maker. Any of the candidates except the
child may suffer from bias and misinformation if allowed to consider
quality of life; the infant as decision-maker will suffer from incompetence.
In the delivery room, decisions to resuscitate do not lend themselves
to deliberation or discussion. There is usually no time for cool contempla-
tion. Any child with a chance of survival, therefore, should be resusci-
tated unless the doctor knows for certain that treatment would be futile.
Instances of non-resuscitation should be rare, reserved for infants with
conditions, such as anencephaly, known to be lethal. Even infants with
anomalies suspected to be lethal should be resuscitated. Treatment may
later be withdrawn if, after considered deliberation, decision-makers
agree that continued treatment would be hopeless. The greatest danger in
resuscitating a non-viable infant is that the infant might die anyway or
may later need to be removed from life support. The greatest danger in
failing to resuscitate a viable infant in disregard of the child's rights is
that a life will be forever lost. High-risk should not mean insurmountable
risk. No person, through a denial of resuscitation procedures or otherwise,
should be denied an opportunity to live.
